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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in United States v. Alvarez-Machain
held that a criminal defendant, abducted from Mexico, may be
tried in American courts for violations of U.S. law.1 The Court
determined that the extradition treaty between the United
States and Mexico' did not prohibit forcible abductions3 by the
U.S. government, either explicitly or implicitly.4
1. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992).
2. Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter 1978 Extradition
Treaty].
3. See, e.g., M. CHERiF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 121-43 (1974). "Abduction" refers to an individual's seizure and removal to
another nation without the knowledge or consent of the nation in which the seizure
occurs. Id. at 124. "Irregular rendition," on the other hand, refers to the informal
surrender of an individual by agents of one nation to agents of another without formal or
legal process. Id. at 128-29.
4. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 663, 668-69.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain was
sharply criticized both domestically and internationally.5
Domestically, the Supreme Court's ruling spawned a myriad of
law review articles and commentaries.6 Internationally, the
United States received formal protests from many countries.
The Alvarez-Machain decision raises serious questions. One
such question concerns the rights of American bounty hunters8 to
abduct individuals in foreign countries.
In recent years, the approximately seven thousand American
bounty hunters have come to play an indispensable role in the
criminal justice system.9 Bounty hunters enter the scene after
the judicial process has commenced."0 An accused, who has had a
judge-set bail, typically hires a commercial bondsman to file a
bond directly with the court." The accused and the bondsman
sign a contract where the accused pays the bondsman a
percentage of the total bail. 2 In return, the bondsman assumes
the responsibility of paying the remainder of the bail if the
accused fails to appear at trial." When an accused fails to show
up in court, the bondsman usually hires professional bounty
hunters to bring back the accused.4
The powers conferred upon bounty hunters to search for and
apprehend an accused that has jumped bail are equivalent to
5. William J. Aceves, The Legality of Transborder Abductions: A Study of United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 3 SW. J.L & TRADE AM. 101 (1996).
6. See, e.g., Id. at 101; Bradley Thrush, United States' Sanctioned Kidnappings
Abroad: Can the United States Restore International Confidence in Its Extradition
Treaties?, 11 ARIZ. J. INTL & COMP. L. 181 (1994); Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get
Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939 (1992).
7. Some of the countries included: Mexico (June 1992); Canada (June 1992); China
(Dec. 1992); Denmark (June 1992); Guatemala (Sept. 1992); Malaysia (Oct. 1992); and
Venezuela (June 1992). See Aceves, supra note 5, at 117-20.
8. See John Drimmer, When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of Bounty
Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 731, 732 n.2 (1996)
(citing PAUL B. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF PRETRIAL RELEASE 59
(1974) (stating that the rights and restrictions associated with bounty hunters are
"equally germane" to those of bail bondsmen, despite the fact that the bondsman has the
ultimate legal authority over the defendant; bounty hunters exercise such rights far more
frequently than bondsmen themselves)); See also Commonwealth v. Brickett, 25 Mass. (1
Pick.) 137, 141 (1829) (recognizing that bounty hunters have the same rights as
bondsmen).
9. See Drimmer, supra note 8, at 735, 787.
10. See id. at 743.
11. See id. at 741-42.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 742.
14. See id. at 743.
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those of a police officer pursuing an escaped prisoner,'5 but
without similar training or restrictions. 6 In addition, many
bounty hunters are ex-convicts,"' and only are paid by the
bondsman when they present either the accused or his death
certificate to the court before the bond is lost."8  Thus,
unfortunately, incidents of abuse can and do frequently arise. '9
The conditions are ripe for another incident involving bounty
hunters; but as a result of the Alvarez-Machain decision, the
abuse will have international implications.
This Comment examines what rights and restrictions, if any,
bounty hunters have to cross the border into Mexico, abduct an
individual, and bring him or her back to be tried in front of an
American court. This Comment argues that currently under both
American and international law bounty hunters have such a
right, although it is a limited right. Furthermore, the United
States has the power to completely prevent American bounty
hunters from abducting individuals inside Mexico, if the United
States chooses to exercise such power.
Part II of this Comment briefly describes the presence of
bounty hunters in American society and the reliance on bounty
hunters in the current judicial system. Part III analyzes the
sources of authority that permit bounty hunters to seize fugitives
and return them to the court. Part IV analyzes the effects of
Supreme Court cases that appear to provide bounty hunters with
unlimited power to enter into Mexico and abduct individuals.
Part V examines whether the holdings in the cases discussed in
Part IV conflict with current international law. Part VI
discusses limits, both actual and potential, on bounty hunters'
rights to enter Mexico and abduct individuals. The Comment
concludes that currently bounty hunters have limited rights to
enter Mexico and abduct individuals. In addition, the Comment
also concludes that a possibility exists that would completely
15. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371-72 (1872); see also infra notes 40-
51 and accompanying text.
16. See Drimmer, supra note 8, at 737.
17. See id. at 732 n.2 (stating that bounty hunters usually carry weapons and quite
often have prior records).
18. See id. at 743.
19. See id. at 735 n.12 (recounting several incidences of abuse, including one bounty
hunter who broke into the home of an innocent man, whom he mistook for a bail jumper,
and shot him to death).
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eliminate American bounty hunters' ability to enter Mexico and
abduct individuals.
II. BOUNTY HUNTERS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
A. The Presence of Bounty Hunters on the Internet
One of the best illustrations of the strong presence of bounty
hunters in American society is the Internet. A search conducted
on one of the many Internet "search engines" reveals the
existence of close to 73,000 sites.20 The sites range from home
pages of bounty hunters2 to national bail bond agencies.22
However, these bail bond agencies offer more services than
providing accused individuals with bail. For example, Hunters
Locators International, a national bail bond agency, offers the
following services in addition to financing bail bonds: 1) Missing
Persons/Background services; 2) Security Consulting services;
and 3) Asset Recovery services.22 In addition to the Internet, the
bounty hunting industry has also resulted in the publication of
many books on the subject.24
B. The Reliance on Bounty Hunters in the Modern
Judicial System
The budget reductions and limitations on spending that state
and local governments have had to endure over the past several
years" has forced government officials to seek alternatives. One
such alternative is the privatization of certain law enforcement
20. Yahoo! (visited June 17, 1998) <http://av.yahoo.com/bin/query?
p-bail&bondsman&hc=0+hs=0>. A search on Yahoo! for the term "bail bondsman" came
up with 72,860 sites.
21. See, e.g., the home page of David A- Mollison, Professional Bail Bond Recovery
Agent (visited June 17, 1998) <http://www.pimall.con/mollison/ Home.dam.html>.
22. See, e.g., the home page of Hunters Locators International (visited June 17, 1998)
<http'J/www.hunterlocatorsintl.com/>.
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., LANCE ALLEN WILKINSON, BEA & RICHARD VERROCHI, CBA, BAIL,
BOUNTY HUNTING AND THE LAW (1997); CHRIS HARPER, BAIL ENFORCEMENT
PROFESSIONAL'S FIELD MANUAL (1997); DAVID MOLLISON, MODERN DAY BOUNTY HUNTING
(1997).
25. See Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 1351, 1371 (1993) (discussing the near bankruptcy of municipal governments and
the subsequent closure of hospitals, police stations, and schools).
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activities. 2r According to Drimmer, states spend approximately
$20,000 a year on the prisoners in the nation's overcrowded
jails.27 In addition, America spends $60,000 per year for every
police officer on the street.2' This problem has led the judicial
system to rely more heavily on the bail process as a means to
29decrease state pretrial costs and relieve the burden on prisons.
However, cuts in police budgets, which have resulted in
manpower shortages, have made it impractical and inefficient for
law enforcement officers to chase those accused individuals who
jump bail.30 Bounty hunters' participation in the criminal justice
system saves the State the expenses of searching for, arresting,
and transporting the accused to court." Drimmer also notes that
"bounty hunters are significantly more effective at retrieving
fugitives than the police, returning 99.2% of suspects committed
to the custody of bondsmen."32 The police, on the other hand,
return only 92% of the fugitives who jump bail while under
public bail."2 Thus, States have come to depend on bondsmen and
bounty hunters to help relieve prison costs and ease prison
overcrowding.
Police also rely on the assistance of bounty hunters in areas
of law enforcement that are beyond the scope of the bail process.'
Police and other government officials work symbiotically with
bounty hunters.35  Frequently, bounty hunters will trade
information with police and law enforcement officials .
26. See Drimmer, supra note 8, at 758.
27. Id. at 759-60.
28. Id. at 760.




33. Id. at 762 n.181 (citing Charles Oliver, National Issues, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY,
May 12, 1994, at 1).
34. See generally Drimmer, supra note 8; Emily Michael Stout, Comment, Bounty
Hunters As Evidence Gathers: Should They Be Considered State Actors Under the Fourth
Amendment When Working With the Police? 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 665 (1997).
35. See Drimmer, supra note 8, at 787 & nn.312 & 317.
36. For example, in United States v. Rose, a bounty hunter arrested an individual
charged with failure to appear at a court hearing. 731 F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 931 (1984). Upon the arrest, the bounty hunter obtained from the
accused the weapon used in the commission of the crime. Id. at 1344-45. In addition, the
accused confessed his involvement in the crime to the bounty hunter. Id. The bounty
hunter handed over the weapon to the police and informed them about the accused's
confession. Id. The court found that the bounty hunter was acting in a private capacity
and, therefore, denied the defense's motion to suppress the weapon and the statements
[Vol. 30:2
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Occasionally, bounty hunters will even help to capture elusive
suspects before these suspects' initial arrest.
III. THE LEGAL AUTHORITY ENABLING BOUNTY HUNTERS TO
SEIZE FUGITIVES
Two major categories of legal authority exist that provide
bounty hunters with the power to apprehend fugitives:
nineteenth-century cases upholding bounty hunters' common law
power" and the Supreme Court's holding that the Fourth
Amendment protections do not apply to private citizens.
39 Each
of these legal categories is discussed below.
A. Nineteenth-Century Cases
1. Taylor v. Taintor
Taylor v. Taintor0 is the cornerstone of bounty hunters'
rights.4 Taylor involved an action by a bondsman, Taylor, to
recover a forfeited bond.42 After his arrest in Connecticut,
McGuire entered into a bail agreement with Taylor and one other
surety." After McGuire's sureties posted his bail, McGuire
returned to his home in New York." However, unbeknownst to
his sureties, McGuire was wanted for a crime he committed while
he was in Maine." The governor of New York, upon a request
from Maine's governor, seized McGuire, immediately extraditing
McGuire to Maine, where he was imprisoned." Since McGuire
was in a prison cell in Maine, he obviously could not appear in
made to the bounty hunter. Id. at 1345.
37. See e.g., United States v. Rhodes, 713 F.2d 463, 467 (9P
b Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1012 (1983), 465 U.S. 1038 (1984) (reporting a bounty hunter's help in the arrest
of the defendants did not make the bounty hunter a government agent).
38. See discussion infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
39. See discussion infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
40. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1872).
41. See Gregory Takacs, Note, Tyranny on the Street: Connecticut's Need for the
Regulation of Bounty Hunters, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 479, 489 (1994) (stating that the
Taylor decision is still the foundation of bounty hunters' rights).
42. Taylor, 83 U.S. at 368.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 369.
46. Id. at 368.
1999]
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front of the Connecticut court as required; therefore, Taylor and
the other surety forfeited the bail amount. 7
In deciding whether the sureties could recover the amount of
the forfeiture, the Court articulated the general common-law
rights ' afforded to bounty hunters:
When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to
the custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of
the original imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do so,
they may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; and
if that cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it
can be done. They may exercise their rights in person or by
agent. They may pursue him into another State; may arrest
him on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter
his house for that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue
of new process. None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest by
the sheriff of an escaping prisoner .... "The bail have their
principal on a string, and may pull the string whenever they
please, and render him in their discharge."
49
Thus, in Taylor, the Court held that the State gave custody
of the accused to a bondsman as means of continuing the
accused's imprisonment, and a bounty hunter's power of arrest
was an extension of the State's initial capture.0 Therefore, a
bounty hunter enjoyed the same rights as a sheriff over an
escaping prisoner, including the use of deadly force in obtaining
custody over a fugitive."'
47. Id.
48. Under the common law in England, the state treated bail as a form of continued
incarceration, and viewed an arrest by the bondsman as an extension of the state's initial
capture. See Drimmer, supra note 8, at 744-51. Before Taylor, American courts adopted
this same view, treating the defendant in a state of endless flight. Id. Therefore,
bondsmen in early America enjoyed the same rights of capture as a jailer over an escaped
prisoner, irrespective of whether the defendant had failed to appear in court. Id. See also
Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145, 155-56 (N.Y. 1810) (stating the broad powers that are
available to the bounty hunter).
49. Taylor, 83 U.S. at 371-72.
50. See Drimmer, supra note 8, at 752.
51. Id. at 752-53. But a few states have passed laws that supercede the Supreme
Court's holding in Taylor. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2927 (1997); TEX. PEN. CODE § 8.03
(1997). For example, courts in Idaho and Texas refused to follow the holding of Taylor
because these states' legislatures enacted laws that abrogated the common law holding of
Taylor. State v. Fry, 910 P.2d 164 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); Green v. State, 829 S.W.2d 222
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Linder v. State of Texas, 779 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
In addition, see footnote 2 in Kear v. Hilton where the court acknowledged that it
proceeded:
[Vol. 30:2
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2. Bounty Hunters Are Not State Actors
The same nineteenth-century courts that held the rights of
bounty hunters were an extension of those rights granted to law
enforcement officials also determined that bounty hunters were
not State actors. 2  These courts held that the bounty hunters'
rights to recapture a fugitive derived not through their
participation as a participant in the judicial process, but rather,
from the private contract between the accused and the
bondsman.53 The result of the nineteenth-century courts' rational
was that, "the comprehensive rights of bondsmen and bounty
hunters, and their assumption of custody over a defendant,
emanated from terms implicit in the private bail contract. Thus,
although bounty hunters and bondsmen functioned as State
proxies for the pretrial criminal process, bounty hunters were not
considered State actors." 4
B. Fourth Amendment Does Not Apply to Private
Citizens
The second legal authority for the power of bounty hunters is
found in the non-application of the Fourth Amendment to private
citizens. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 5
[P]roceed[s] on the assumption that the Taylor decision, which has never been
overruled, remains the law.... [I]t has been a long time since 1872. In the
meantime, the Supreme Court has imposed requirements of recourse to the
judicial process to reclaim property interests.... It seems reasonable to
suppose that liberty interests may be entitled to similar protection.
699 F.2d 181, 182 (4th Cir. 1983).
52. See Drimmer, supra note 8, at 752, 754.
53. See In re Von Der Ahe, 85 F. 959, 960 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898) (determining that
powers of bounty hunters and bondsmen arise solely from private contract); Nicolls, 7
Johns. at 154 (recognizing the power of a bounty hunter and a bondsman to capture a
fugitive results from a contract signed between the bondsman and the principal).
54. Drimmer, supra note 8, at 754-55.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19991
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However, the Supreme Court has declared that the Fourth
Amendment does not extend to searches and seizures, whether
reasonable or unreasonable, conducted by private citizens who
are acting upon their own initiative, without any governmental
influence.66 Federal courts have concluded that bounty hunters
are private actors; therefore, the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to arrests made by bounty hunters." Bounty hunters have
the powers of police officers, but without any of the constitutional
restraints imposed upon police officers: 8 "Thus, bounty hunters
have the authority to break into defendants' homes and take
them into custody, and can seize or elicit incriminating evidence
and statements that, whether voluntary or coerced, will be
admissible against the defendant in court."9
IV. AUTHORITY FOR BOUNTY HUNTERS' APPARENT UNLIMITED
POWER TO ACT INTERNATIONALLY
Recent Supreme Court decisions have at first glance effected
the rights of bounty hunters to abduct individuals in Mexico.
The Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez 1 and United States v. Alvarez-Machain,6' coupled with
its reaffirmation of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,62 have provided
bounty hunters with the legal power to abduct individuals in
Mexico. The following is a discussion of each of these cases and
their apparent contributions to the legal powers of bounty
hunters.
56. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (declaring that the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unlawful searches and seizure applies only to
governmental action); see e.g. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive's Association, 489 U.S.
602, 614 (1989) (noting that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches and
seizures undertaken by a private party upon his own initiative).
57. See United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1345 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 931 (1984); United States v. Rhodes, 713 F.2d 463, 467 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1012 (1983), 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
58. See Drimmer, supra note 8, at 769-73.
59. Id. at 770-71 & nn.222 & 223.
60. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
61. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
62. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is derived from two Supreme Court decisions: Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). See also
discussion supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30:2
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A. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez I
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez I apparently provides bounty hunters with an
unchecked power to act internationally. The facts of the case
began when the United States obtained a warrant for Verdugo-
Urquidez and Mexican law enforcement agents, who after
conferring with United States law enforcement officials, forcibly
abducted Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican citizen, and delivered
him to United States Marshals in California. 3 The marshals
arrested Verdugo-Urquidez for both his participation in the
murder of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Special Agent
Enrique Camarena-Salazar and his alleged narcotics
trafficking.64  After Verdugo-Urquidez's arrest, DEA agents
sought and obtained permission from the Director General of the
Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) to search Verdugo-
Urquidez's residences in Mexico for evidence of the alleged
crimes. 5 DEA and MFJP agents searched the residences and
seized a tally sheet, which the government believed implicated
Verdugo-Urquidez in narcotics smuggling into the United
States .66
The District Court granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to
suppress the tally sheet, concluding that the Fourth Amendment
applied to the searches and the DEA agents failed to justify
searching Verdugo-Uriquidez's residences without a warrant."7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, citing the principle
established by a plurality of the Justices in Reid v. Covert68 that
constitutional restrictions limit exercises of United States
government power, whether at home or abroad." Further, the
63. Id. at 262.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 262-63.
67. Id. at 263.
68. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
69. Verdugo-Urquidez 1, 494 U.S. at 263. In Reid, Justice Black wrote:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the
limitations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government reaches out
to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.
Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6.
1999]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
Ninth Circuit, relying on a prior Supreme Court opinion that
implied that illegal aliens in the United States have Fourth
Amendment rights,"0 concluded that the Fourth Amendment also
protects non-citizens abroad, such as Verdugo-Urquidez. 7"
Having determined that the Fourth Amendment applied to the
searches of Verdugo-Urquidez's residences, the Ninth Circuit
held that the searches violated the Constitution because the DEA
agents failed to obtain a search warrant."2
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, overruled
the Ninth Circuit, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to the search and seizure by United States law
enforcement agents of property owned by a foreign national and
located in another country.73 The majority concluded Verdugo-
Urquidez lacked the "voluntary connection" with the United
States necessary to receive the protections of the Fourth
Amendment."
In explaining why Verdugo-Urquidez lacked a sufficient
connection to the United States so as to fall within the
protections of the Fourth Amendment, the majority first
contrasted the text of the Fourth Amendment with those of other
Amendments.75  The Court noted that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments use the words "person" and "accused," whereas the
First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments use the
word "people."7 6 The majority found that:
"[Tihe people" protected by the Fourth Amendment .... refers
to a class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community.... The
70. Verdugo-Urquidez I, 494 U.S. at 272 (noting that the Ninth Circuit should not be
faulted for interpreting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) to stand for the
proposition that fourth amendment rights do not apply to deportation hearings without
directly deciding fourth amendment rights of illegal aliens).
71. Verdugo-Urquidez I, 494 U.S. at 263.
72. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that an American search warrant
would have no legal validity in Mexico, the Ninth Circuit deemed it sufficient that a
warrant would have great constitutional value in the United States. Id. at 263-64. The
Ninth Circuit believed the search warrant would reflect a neutral magistrate's
determination that probable cause existed to conduct the search, and the warrant would
define the scope of such a search. Id.
73. Id. at 274-75.
74. Id. at 273.
75. Id. at 265.
76. Id.
472 [Vol. 30:2
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language of these Amendments contrasts with the words
"person" and "accused" used in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments regulating procedure in criminal cases."
The Court found the Ninth Circuit's expansive
extraterritorial application of the Constitution contrary to the
Court's decision in the Insular Cases,"8 which held that "not every
constitutional provision applies to governmental activity even
where the United States has sovereign power."79 The Court
concluded that the Fourth Amendment was one such
"constitutional provision. ' 8°
Finally, the Court found the Ninth Circuit's reliance on
Lopez-Mendoza unpersuasive. 81  The question presented to the
Lopez-Mendoza Court did not encompass whether the protections
of the Fourth Amendment extend to illegal aliens in the United
States; thus, the Lopez-Mendoza's statements on that subject are
not dispositive But even assuming illegal aliens would be
entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, their situation differs
from Verdugo-Urquidez's."3 The illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza
were in the United States voluntarily;84 Verdugo-Urquidez,
however, "had no voluntary connection with this country that
might place him among 'the people' of the United States."85
The ramifications of Verdugo-Urquidez I on bounty hunters
ability to abduct individuals in Mexico seem to be great. Mexican
nationals who are in Mexico have no connections so as to be
considered one of "the people" whom the Fourth Amendment
protects.8 The Supreme Court's decision in Verdugo-Urquidez,
combined with the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Fourth
77. Id. at 265-66.
78. Id. at 268. The Insular Cases consist of the following cases: Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1900); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138 (1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
79. Verdugo-Urquidez 1, 494 U.S. 276 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
80. Id. at 267.
81. Id. at 272.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 272-73.
84. Id. at 273.
85. Id. Justice Stevens in his concurrence argued that Verdugo-Urquidez should be
included as one of "the people" since he was lawfully present in this country even though
he was brought and held in America against his will. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J. concurring).
86. Randall Miller, The Limits of U.S. International Law Enforcement After
Verdugo-Urquidez: Resurrecting Rochin, 58 U. PIT. L REV. 867, 884-85 (1997).
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Amendment does not apply to private citizens," provides an open
invitation to bounty hunters to abduct individuals in Mexico.
The reason for this is the Fourth Amendment does not protect
Mexican nationals who have no connections to the United States
and does not limit bounty hunters in their conduct.
B. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
The second of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements
that apparently broaden bounty hunters' rights is the Court's
reaffirmation of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. The Ker-Frisbie
doctrine permits courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant regardless of the illegal manner in which the
defendant was brought before the court.88  The Ker-Frisbie
doctrine is the modem equivalent of the Roman maxim male
captus, bene detenus-improperly captured, properly detained.89
1. Ker v. Illinois
The first part of the doctrine is Ker v. Illinois.90 This case
involved the forcible abduction and repatriation to the United
States of Ker, an American citizen who had fled to Peru after
embezzling from a Chicago bank.9' Julian, a Pinkerton agent,
was dispatched with formal extradition papers to present to the
Peruvian Government. 2 Instead of presenting the necessary
papers to the Peruvian government, Julian forcibly abducted Ker
from Peru and brought him back to the United States where he
was convicted. The Court viewed Ker's abduction as a clear
87. Supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
88. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (determining that the power of
courts is not impaired when faced with a criminal defendant seized by "forcible
abduction"); accord Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 523 (1952) (declaring that the
Constitution does not prohibit finding of guilt when criminal defendant is forcibly
abducted).
89. Jacques Semmelman, Due Process, International Law, and Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Defendants Abducted Extraterritorially: The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine Reexamined,
30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 513, 514 & n.8 (1992).
90. Ker, 119 U.S. at 436.
91. Id. at 438.
92. Id.
93. Id. The opinion stated that Julian arrived in Peru with extradition papers, "but,
without presenting them to any officer of the Peruvian government, or making any
demand on that government for the surrender of Ker, forcibly and with violence arrested
him." Id. However, in his article, Charles Faiman states that when Julian arrived in
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case of kidnapping within Peru, without any pretext of authority
under the treaty or by the government of the United States.94
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction finding that the
abduction did not violate Ker's due process rights since his
criminal trial met the Constitution's necessary due process
requirements." The Ker Court also determined that the
abduction did not violate the extradition treaty because, since his
abduction was carried out beyond its scope, the treaty was not
applicable and could not invoke its protection." According to the
Court, a private abduction, performed without the consent of the
United States, lay completely outside the reach of the treaty.97
2. Frisbie v. Collins
The second case that constitutes the Ker-Frisbie doctrine is
Frisbie v. Collins."5 In this case, Collins had been convicted of
murder, in a Michigan court.9 In his habeas corpus petition,
Collins argued that his conviction should be overturned because
the police officers forcibly seized and beat Collins up when they
brought him from Chicago, where he had been living, to Michigan
for trial. ' The Court rejected Collins' argument that he should
be released as a result of the forcible manner in which he came
before the court.'' The Court made the following statement:
[The Supreme Court] has never departed from the rule
announced in [Kerl that the power of a court to try a person
for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a forcible
abduction. No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify
overruling the line of cases.... There is nothing in the
Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person
Peru, Lima was under Chilean military occupation and that Chilean authorities aided
Julian in arresting Ker. Charles Faiman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 678,
685 (1953). The opinion, however, makes no notice of the political turmoil in Peru. Ker,
119 U.S. 436.
94. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
95. Id. at 440.
96. Id. at 442.
97. Id.
98. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
99. Id. at 520.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 523.
1999] 475
476 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2
rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought
to trial against his will.
10 2
For over 100 years, American courts routinely have invoked
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, with very little judicial opposition.'
The continued adherence of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine will
seemingly enable American bounty hunters to enter Mexico,
abduct Mexican nationals, and present the abductees in front of
American courts without the courts losing their jurisdiction to try
the abductees.
C. United States v. Alvarez-Machain
The third recent Supreme Court case that appears to
increase the legal rights of bounty hunters is United Sates v.
Alvarez-Machain."4 The issue in the case was whether Alvarez-
Machain's abduction from Mexico violated the 1978 Extradition
Treaty.0 5 Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national,
was one of the individuals indicted in connection with the murder
of DEA Special Agent Camarena-Salazar.1°s The United States
accused Alvarez-Machain of administering life-sustaining drugs
to Camarena-Salazar during his torture by Mexican drug lords."7
The DEA first unsuccessfully tried to secure Alvarez-Machain's
102. Id. at 522.
103. Timothy D. Rudy, Did We Treaty Away Ker-Frisbie? 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 791, 802
(1995). Only one case has limited the Ker-Frisbie to any serious extent. Id. at 808. In
United States v. Toscanino, the Second Circuit declared where a defendant, such as
Toscanino, was subjected to grotesque treatment and incessant torture, it should result in
the dismissal of charges against the defendant. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). The Court
stated that where it meets an intersection of the restrictive view of the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine and the more expanded and enlightened interpretation of due process, the court
is required to dispose itself of jurisdiction over a defendant where such jurisdiction was
acquired as "a result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable
invasion of the accused's constitutional rights." Id. at 275. However, Toscanino became
toothless. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1975)
(holding that an irregularity in the capture does not by itself violate due process; the
government conduct complained of must rise to the level of shocking the conscience as did
the conduct in Toscanino); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975) (confining the
Toscanino exception to situations in which agents of the United States play a direct role).
Further, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have expressly rejected the Toscanino
exception, and the Fifth Circuit has been unreceptive to it. See Semmelman, supra note
89, at 537.
104. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
105. Id. at 662.
106. Id. at 657.
107. Id.
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presence in the United States through informal discussions with
representatives of the MFJP'0 DEA officials then, through a
contact in Mexico, offered to pay a reward and expenses in return
for the delivery of Alvarez-Machain to the United States.'0 9 In
April of 1990, Alvarez-Machain was forcibly abducted from his
medical office in Mexico, flown to Texas, and immediately
arrested by DEA Agents."0
The District Court upheld Alvarez-Machain's motion to
dismiss, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to try Alvarez-
Machain."' The Ninth Circuit in a per curiam decision affirmed
the dismissal of the indictment, relying on its decision in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 1I.12 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's finding that the United States authorized
Alvarez-Machain's abduction and that Mexico officially protested
the abduction.11  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit ordered the
indictment dismissed and that Alvarez-Machain be repatriated to
Mexico."'
The Supreme Court stated that before it could determine
whether the abduction of Alvarez-Machain violated the 1978
Extradition Treaty, it first had to determine whether the treaty
in fact prohibited abductions."5 The Court reasoned that if the
treaty did not prohibit abductions, then the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
would apply, and it would not have to concern itself over how the
defendant came before the Court."' However, if the treaty did
prohibit forcible abductions, then the rule in United States v.
108. Id. at 657 n.2.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 657.
111. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
112. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991),
vacated, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Ninth Circuit
held that although the 1978 Extradition Treaty did not expressly prohibit forcible
abductions, the purpose of the Treaty was violated by a forcible abduction, which, along
with a formal protest by the offended nation, would give a defendant the right to invoke
the violation of the Treaty to defeat a District Court's jurisdiction. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1991).
113. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991). On at
least two occasions, Mexico formally protested Alvarez-Machain's abduction through
diplomatic notes to the United States government. Alvarez-Machain 504 U.S. at 671, n.1
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
114. Id. at 659.




Rauscher"1 ' would control, and therefore, Alvarez-Machain could
not be prosecuted."'
The Court first noted that the language of the treaty said
nothing about either the United States or Mexico refraining
from, or the consequences for, forcibly abducting citizens from
the territory of the other country.' The Court also determined
that a prohibition on forcible abductions could not implicitly be
read into the treaty because "to infer from this treaty and its
terms that it prohibits all means of gaining the presence of an
individual outside of its terms goes beyond established precedent
and practice."'20 Thus, the Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit,
held that the 1978 Extradition Treaty does not specifically
disallow extraterritorial abductions, and that an implied term
prohibiting international abductions cannot be read into the
treaty.121
The majority's decision in Alvarez-Machain has great
significance for bounty hunters. Unless the United States and
Mexico enact legislation specifically prohibiting international
abductions, then bounty hunters apparently will be able to enter
Mexican territory and abduct Mexican nationals. American
courts will still have jurisdiction over the abductees and the
bounty hunters will still be paid.
V. UNITED STATES' ACCEPTANCE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
ABDUCTIONS APPEARS TO CONFLICT WITH INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The United States' continued acceptance of extraterritorial
abductions, in the form of the judicial decisions discussed
above,'22 is apparently in direct conflict with international law.
This position seems to violate both customary international law
and international treaty law.
117. 119 U.S. 407, 411 (1886) (holding that a defendant cannot be prosecuted in
violation of the terms of an extradition treaty).
118. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 659-60.
119. Id. at 663.
120. Id. at 668-69. In his disent Justice Stevens conceded that the 1978 Extradition
Treaty lacks express language preventing either country from forcibly abducting citizens
from the territory of the country; however, he argues that the language and spirit of the
1978 Extradition Treaty prohibits such forcible abductions. Id. at 671-75.
121. Id. at 669-70.
122. See discussion supra notes 60-121.
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A. Customary International Law
Customary international law consists of duties and
privileges that States continue to follow from a sense of legal
obligation.23 However, a State is not bound by the duty if it has
consistently acted as a persistent objector to the application of
that particular customary international law."
According to the landmark International Court of Justice's
Corfu Channel case, "the first and foremost restriction imposed
by international law upon a State is that.., it may not exercise
its power in any form in the territory of another State. " 125  A
State, therefore, has an absolute right to exercise its authority
within the borders of its own territory. 12 As the Fourth Circuit
said in Collier v. Vaccaro: "An unlawful arrest is merely an
offense against the peace and dignity of the State; an unlawful
carrying of a citizen beyond its boundaries to be dealt with by the
laws of another State is a violation of the sovereignty of the
former.1 27
The United States cannot claim that it is a persistent
objector to the prohibition against extraterritorial abductions,
and thus, not bound by customary international law. While
American courts have generally upheld the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,
some American diplomats and officials have recognized
abductions as violations of customary international law."5
Moreover, "the United States did not exercise a veto in the
United Nations' Security Council... when the Security Council
condemned Israel's abduction of Adolph Eichmann from
123. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 54-55 (3d ed.
1993). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1986) ("Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.").
124. See Asylum (Columbia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277-78 (Nov. 20).
125. Corfu Channel (U.K v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) ("Between independent
States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international
relations.").
126. See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE 252 (2d rev. ed. 1987).
127. Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1931).
128. See Rudy, supra note 103, at 801. For example, during a congressional
subcommittee hearing, Abraham D. Sofaer, the former State Department Legal Advisor,
stated that "[tihe United States had repeatedly associated itself with the view that
unconsented arrests violate the principle of territorial integrity." Id. at 801 n.57.
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Argentina."129 Therefore, the United States appears to violate
customary international law when it permits bounty hunters to
cross the border and seize Mexican nationals.
The territoriality principle is not the only basis for a State to
claim jurisdiction over an individual.13 One such principle is the
effects doctrine. 3 ' The effects doctrine is the principle by which a
State extends its jurisdiction to cover the conduct of foreign
nationals committed abroad, but which has effects within the
State's territory.'32 Another principle is the protective principle,
by which a State has jurisdiction over a foreign national when
the foreign national commits a serious crime against the State's
own safety.'33 Such crimes include "threaten[ing] the political or
military security of the [S]tate", or "counterfeiting its currency."34
However, these jurisdictional principles do not justify
American bounty hunters crossing the Mexican border and
seizing individuals within Mexico. The assertion of such
jurisdictional bases has the real potential:
[O]f infringing [upon] the sovereign rights of that state to
regulate matters taking place in its territory.... There comes
a point... [at which] the application of a state's criminal law to
the activities of foreigners in a foreign state involves an
infringement of the territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction of
the foreign state to which it may properly object.
135
Therefore, America cannot rely on these alternative
jurisdictional bases to conclude that American bounty hunters
have the legal authority under customary international law to
enter Mexican territory and capture individuals within Mexico.
129. Id. at 801-802.
130. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw § 139, 466-78 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir
Arthur Watts eds., 9thed. 1992).
131. Id. at 472.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 470.
134. Id. at 470-71.
135. Id. at 476.
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B. International Treaty Law
1. The United Nations Charter
The first international treaty that appears to prohibit
American bounty hunters from capturing individuals in Mexico is
the United Nations Charter. Both the United States and Mexico
are parties to the United Nations Charter."6 The goals of the
United Nations include the maintenance of international peace
and security in order to promote friendly relations and
international cooperation among nations in solving international
problems.137 To this end the Charter provides that "[a]ll members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." 8'
It is reasonable to regard American bounty hunters entering
Mexico's territory and abducting Mexican nationals as a force
that threatens and violates the territorial integrity of Mexico.
Thus, the United Nations treaty would appear to prohibit
American bounty hunters from entering Mexico and kidnapping
Mexican nationals.
2. Organization of American States Charter
The second international treaty that seems to prevent
American bounty hunters from engaging in activities in Mexico is
the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) Charter. Both the
United States and Mexico are also parties to the O.A.S.
Charter.'39  Article 5 of the O.A.S. Charter provides:
"International order consists essentially of respect for the
personality, sovereignty and independence of States, and the
faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and other
136. U.N. Charter, opened for signature June 26, 1945, 59 STAT. 1031 (entered into
force Oct. 31, 1945).
137. See U.N. Charter, art. 1.
138. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
139. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
119 U.N.T.S. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 2361.
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sources of international law."4 ' Article 17 states that a State's
territory is inviolable, and that the State may not object on any
grounds to measures of force taken by another State, either
directly or indirectly, against the first State. 4'
The Inter-American Juridical Committee, an advisory body
on legal matters for the O.A.S., declared in an opinion that
extraterritorial abductions "are a serious violation of public
international law since they violate the principle of territorial
sovereignty."' 2 Thus, the O.A.S. Charter appears to prohibit
extraterritorial abductions.
3. Civil and Political Covenant
The third treaty to apparently prohibit international bounty
hunting is the Civil and Political Covenant. The Civil and
Political Covenant, 41 to which the United States is a party,
appears to prohibit extraterritorial abductions in several
provisions. First, Article 9(1) states that "[elveryone has the
right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure established by law.""'4 Second, Article 9(4) states that
"[alnyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that
that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his
detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful."145
Because the United States is now a party to the Civil and
Political Covenant, it would appear that it can no longer legally
allow extraterritorial abductions.
140. Id. art. 3(b).
141. Id. art. 20.
142. See Aceves, supra note 5, at 151 (discussing Legal opinion of the Inter-American
Juridical Committee on the Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain
Case, Inter-American Juridical Committee, Doe. No. CJIIRES.II-15/92, reprinted in 13
HuM. RTS. L.J. 395 (1992).
143. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1996, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
144. Id. art. 9(1).
145. Id. art. 9(4).
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C. Why International Law May Not Apply to
Bounty Hunters
Three reasons exist why international law may not apply to
American bounty hunters who cross into Mexico and abduct
individuals. First, international law concerns the relationship
between States; it generally does not govern the conduct of
individuals who act strictly in a private capacity.146 Thus, even if
customary international law prohibits extraterritorial
abductions, it would have no effect on bounty hunters who enter
Mexico and seize Mexican nationals. The reason for this is that
American courts still hold that bounty hunters are not State
agents,14 ' and therefore, as private individuals, international law
does not apply to them.
The second reason that international law may not apply to
bounty hunters is that the U.N. and O.A.S. Charters' apparent
prohibition on extraterritorial abductions will not act as an
impediment against the American bounty hunters who cross the
border into Mexico and abduct individuals. Federal courts have
traditionally held that the U.N. and O.A.S. Charters are non-self-
executing."  A treaty, or a treaty provision, is self-executing
when a court can directly apply the treaty or provision without
further legislation. 49 A treaty, or treaty provision, is non-self-
executing if further implementing legislation is needed to effect
the treaty or provision.
60
The final reason why international law may not apply to
American bounty hunters is that the Civil and Political Covenant
may not prevent American bounty hunters from conducting
extraterritorial abductions in Mexico. Upon ratification of the
Civil and Political Covenant, the Senate approved a declaration
146. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as
Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 25, 32 (1973). However, an
increasing trend in international law is to treat individuals, on a limited basis, as subjects
of international law. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 130, at. 849. For
example, "[s]tates... occasionally... confer upon individuals, both their own subjects
and aliens, international rights.., which they can enforce in their own name before
international tribunals." See id. at 847.
147. See Drimmer, supra note 8, at 764.
148. See e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Hitai v.
INS, 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965). But cf United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267,
276-77 (2d Cir. 1974) (hinting that the U.N. Charter was self-executing).




stating that Articles 1 through 27 of the treaty are non-self-
executing.6 1 Thus, if the federal courts hold that the treaty is in
fact non-self-executing, the extraterritorial abductees will not be
able to rely on the Civil and Political Covenant to claim that their
abduction violated international law, and therefore, that they
should be released.
VI. ACTUAL LIMITS ON BOUNTY HUNTERS' ABILITY TO ENTER
MEXICO AND ABDUCT MEXICAN NATIONALS
While current international law does not appear to represent
an impediment for American bounty hunters to enter Mexico's
territory and abduct its citizens, two limitations potentially exist
that provide a limitation on the ability of American bounty
hunters to exercise their rights in Mexico. The first limitation is
a United States Supreme Court decision. The second limitation
is a proposed new treaty between the United States and Mexico,
accompanied by a partial change in the manner that American
courts view bounty hunters.
A. Reese v. United States
The first limitation on American bounty hunters legal rights
to abduct Mexican nationals on Mexican soil is Reese v. United
States."' In Reese, Limantour was indicted on criminal charges
in a federal district court in San Francisco.' Limantour hired
two commercial bondsmen, Reese and Castro, to post his bond,
which required Limantour to appear at the next regular term of
the court and at any subsequent term." The government and
Limantour, with the court's approval, but without the knowledge
of the sureties, agreed to postpone the prosecution of the criminal
charges until the resolution of two land grant cases pending
against Limantour."' In addition, the parties agreed that
Limantour could return to Mexico, his native country, in the
151. See id. at 820. It is worthwhile to note, however, that the Senate approved a
declaration, rather than a reservation. See id. A declaration, unlike a reservation, "has
no conclusive international legal effect." See id. For a comprehensive discussion on
whether American courts should and will find the Civil and Political Covenant self-
executing, see Rudy, supra note 103, at 791.
152. See Reese v. U.S., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 13 (1869).
153. Id. at 18.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 19.
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interim."' However, Limantour never returned from Mexico, and
an order was entered forfeiting the bail.15 '
The United States brought an action against Reese and
Castro in their capacity as the sureties.' 8 The Supreme Court
reversed the district court's finding against the sureties. ' 59 In its
decision, the Supreme Court noted that under the law of
recognizance, once the defendant is placed in the custody of the
sureties, the defendant:
[I]s so far placed in [the sureties'] power that they may at any
time arrest him [the defendant] upon the recognizance and
surrender him to the court, and, to the extent necessary to
accomplish this, may restrain him of his liberty. This power of
arrest can only be exercised within the territory of the United
States. 16o
The importance of Reese as a limitation cannot be overstated.
The common law, the same authority that provides American
bounty hunters with their expansive powers within the United
States, 61 also sets a clear limitation on their power. Whenever a
bounty hunter participates in activities that derive their legal
authority from the common law, as articulated in Taylor,6' he
must also simultaneously observe the limitations imposed by the
common law, as articulated in Reese. Therefore, an American
bounty hunter cannot enter Mexico to abduct a Mexican national,
or any other citizen, who has jumped bail.
B. Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions
The second potential limitation on the ability of American
bounty hunters to enter Mexico and seize individuals is the
United States-Mexico Treaty to Prohibit Transborder
Abductions.' To correct the Supreme Court's interpretation in
156. Id.
157. Id. at 19-20.
158. Id. at 18.
159. Id. at 22.
160. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
161. See discussion supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text.
162. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366 (1872).
163. See Reese, 76 U.S. at 13.
164. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, Nov. 23,
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Alvarez-Machain that the 1978 Extradition Treaty did not
prohibit transborder abductions, the United States and Mexico
entered into negotiations designed to address this issue."5 The
purpose of the treaty is to prohibit transborder abductions, and it
recognizes that abductions are an extraditable offense under the
1978 Extradition Treaty between the United States and
Mexico. 6
The treaty states that a transborder abduction occurs when a
person is removed from the territory of one party to the territory
of the other party either: (a) by force or threat of force; or (b) by
federal, state or local government officials of the party to whose
territory the person is taken, or by private individuals acting
under the direction of such officials."7 The treaty provides two
remedies for any transborder abduction that is found to have
occurred: repatriation of the abductee and the prosecution of any
individual responsible for the abduction.16
Before the Transborder Abductions Treaty can serve as the
second limitation on American bounty hunters' legal rights to
enter Mexico and seize abductees, however, the treaty must
overcome two obstacles. First, the treaty must be ratified before
it enters into force.166 As of January 1999, the proposed treaty
has not yet been submitted to the Senate for advice and
consent.'7
The second obstacle is the American courts' consistent
interpretation that bounty hunters are not State agents. 7'
Under the Transborder Abductions Treaty, abductions by purely
private individuals with no government authorization are not
1994, U.S.-Mex., reprinted in 5 MICHAEL ABBELL AND BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: CRIMINAL EXTRADITION (1995) [hereinafter 1994 Transborder
Abductions Treaty]. ' he provisions of the agreement may only be invoked by the parties
and are not intended to benefit third parties. The agreement does not give rise to a right
on the part of any private person." Aceves, supra note 5, at 156, n.259.
165. See Aceves, supra note 5, at 156.
166. Id.
167. See 1994 Transborder Abductions Treaty, supra note 164, art. 3(2). The treaty
recognizes that the following actions do not establish a transborder abduction: (a)
transfers of persons pursuant to a treaty; (b) deportations, voluntary departures,
expulsions, or other actions taken pursuant to immigration laws; and, (c) other actions
jointly agreed by the heads of the United States' Department of Justice and Mexico's
Office of the Attorney General or their respective designees. Id.
168. Id. arts. 5-6.
169. See Aceves, supra note 5, at 158.
170. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 177-86 (1997).
171. See discussion supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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covered under the treaty.' Thus, because American courts view
bounty hunters as private individuals acting with no government
authorization, bounty hunters can still abduct an individual
inside Mexico as long as that individual was not a principal.
However, American courts could overcome this obstacle if
they adopted the philosophy taken by several legal
commentators: bounty hunters are agents of the State.'7 3  The
Supreme Court has found that whenever a private individual
becomes "clothed" with the State's authority and acts pursuant to
that authority, the individual has transformed into a State actor
whose conduct is limited by constitutional principles. 74 State
action exists when the State coerced or encouraged an individual
to act on behalf of the State so that the individual's conduct is
attributable to the State.' In addition, State action exists if a
private actor willfully participates together with the State or its
agents. 7
The close relationship that bounty hunters have with law
enforcement agents77 actually causes bounty hunters to become
State agents. As State agents, bounty hunters would then fall
under the Transborder Abductions Treaty since they are private
individuals acting under the direction of government officials.' 8
The classification of bounty hunters as government agents,
would, under the terms of the Transborder Abductions Treaty,
prohibit bounty hunters from seizing individuals inside Mexico
where such seizure is done beyond the scope of the bail process.
VII. CONCLUSION
Bounty hunters provide an important service to the
American criminal justice system. They provide the facilitation
of a defendant's release from prison, thereby saving the State
172. See Aceves, supra note 5, at 156-57.
173. See generally Drimmer, supra note 8, at 731; Stout, supra note 34, at 665; Perry
John Seaman, Comment, International Bountyhunting: A Question of State Responsibility,
15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 397 (1985).
174. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1951).
175. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executive Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (holding that
a railroad becomes a state actor when it tests employees for drugs in compliance with
federal regulations).
176. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).
177. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
178. 1994 Transborder Abductions Treaty, supra note 164, art. 3.
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significant expenses.7 ' Due to the importance of this service, and
their overall effectiveness at providing such a service, bounty
hunters have been granted a great deal of authority to
accomplish this service. Over time, bounty hunters have
provided more and more services, while still retaining the same
amount of power. The nature of the business combined with the
type of individuals whom bounty hunters pursue, congers up
images of the gunslingers of the Old West who were sheriffs of
frontier towns. But just as with those sheriffs, it's quite often
difficult to tell the good guys from the outlaws where bounty
hunters are concerned. The simple fact is that excessive conduct
by bounty hunters when seizing an individual, although always
unfortunate and often tragic, happens more often than not.
Because of the globalization of the world and the shrinking of
national borders, the next incident involving a bounty hunter is
likely to have international implications. And due to its
proximity to the United States, Mexico and its citizens are likely
to be the recipient of such excessive conduct.
This Comment has examined the rights of American bounty
hunters to enter Mexico and abduct individuals inside Mexico's
borders. The Supreme Court has granted bounty hunters
sweeping powers to engage in their activities within the United
States. The Comment concludes that while current international
law is powerless from preventing bounty hunters from
conducting their operations inside Mexico, the Supreme Court
has largely restricted bounty hunters' legal rights to cross into
Mexico and arrest principals. The United States can completely
prohibit bounty hunters from entering Mexico and abducting
anybody with the ratification of the Transborder Abduction
Treaty, and the classification of bounty hunters as agents of the
State.
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